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8 FOOD  CRISIS  AND  THE  COMMUNITY'S  RESPONSIBILITIES  TOWARDS 
DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
1.  The  developing  countries are  confronted with  a  food  crisis 
of seriousness  unequalled since the years  immediately  following the 
Second  World  War.  The  general scarcity of basic  foodstuffs  and  their 
high  prices  give  rise to  grave  concern,  even  alarm,  in many  places, 
and  the outline of the  future  is uncertain.  In those  circumstances, 
Europe  must.show its awareness  of the  sudden  dramatic  deterioration 
in the  situation of the  poorest  countries,  and  must  rise to its iespon-
sibilities towards  the  victims  of the  crisis. 
I.  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  CRJ$IS 
2.  Its Recent  Symptoms  - During  the last  two  years,  there  have 
been  se~ious  food  short•ges,  occasionally reaching  famine  propor-
tions ih' such places  as'' the Sahel  zone  of Africa  including Ethiopia, 
Bangladesh,  and  some  other countries  in Asia  and  Latin  America.  Related 
to  these  localized shortages,  there  have  been  exceptionally steep rises 
in prices of most  basic  foodstuffs  throughout  the  world,  which  have 
accentuated the  difficu·lties  of meeting  basic  food  needs  in developing 
countries. 
3.  While  some  developing  countries  may  have  derived  an'  advantage 
from  higher prices of a  :few  export  commodities  1  the benefits to  these 
:.  ,I 
countries  have  been  very unevenly  spread and,  except  in the  case  of 
such  special  commodities  as oil and  some  other minerals  in permanent 
shortage.,  these benefits are  precarious and  minimal  in comparison with 
the  ge~eral disadvantages  caused by price  increases  in basic  food 
imports  .• 
4.  . Its Short-Term  Causes  - The  main  immediate  cause  of the 
crisis .has  been  recurrent  drought  and  other unfavourable  weather 
conditions  in  many  parts of the  world,  resulting in extensive production 
.;. 2. 
cuts,  sharp  rise in import  demand,  immensely heavy purchases  of  grains 
by the Soviet  Union last  year,  and  a  heavy drawing  down  of carryover 
stocks  throughout  the world. 
5.  Natural hazards  alone  can  not,  however,  account  in full  for 
this situation.  In addition,  there has  been  a  series of monetary  crises, 
coupled; with  fierce  inflationary pressllrea  in much  of the world,  and 
with  extremely strong  s~eculative tendencies,  originating primarily 
in  foreign  exchange  fluctuations  and,  in turn,  re-inforcing the  phy-
sical shortages  of many  food  products.  Moreover,  there is  now  a  growing 
energy crisis,  whose  full  cansequences  cannot  as yet  be  foreseen,  but 
which  is putting new  pressures also  on  the  economies  of many  developing 
countries. (l) 
6.  Its Longer-Term  Causes  - The  catastrophic  effects of recent 
shortages of basic  food  products  on  the  economies  of developing  countries 
have  been, superimposed  on  the  long~rm problems  of their  food  production 
failing to  catch up  with  their  food  demand.  In the last  few  years,  the 
developing  countries as  a  whole  have  not  been  making  the  advances  in 
their agriculture  which  they need  to  make,  and  which  - in the  quite 
recent  past  - were  regarded  as  being within relatively close reach as 
a  result  of the  technological progress,  like the  development  of high 
yielding varieti•s  of cereals. 
?.  Certainly,  in the  first  two  years  of the  United Nations'  Second 
Developm•nt  Decade,  agricultural produation in developing  sou~tries 
has  fallen  short  of the.· annual production targets set  for  this period. 
Some  of the  reasons  for  the  so  far  limited progress  of  11Green  Revolution'1 
in these  countries may  turn  out  to  be  comparatively short-term  in 
character,  such  as  the  recent  problem  of world  fertilizer prices  and 
supplies. 
./. 
(1)  From  three directions  :  through  the higher cost  of oil  ~mports 
themselves,  through  lower  export  earnings  following  a  possible 
downturn  in  economic  activity of the  industrialized world,  and 
through  resulting rises  in prices of non-oil  imports  from  the 
developed  countries. 3. 
8.  Unfortunately,  there  exist  other,  longer-term  impediments, 
such as  the rapidly growing population,  the existing rigidities in 
their institutional and social systems,  and  the  growing  dependence  of 
their agriculture  on  scarce  capital and  technology  for rising yields. 
These  suggest  that  major  increases  in per  caput  food  production  may 
not  be  easy to  achieve  in many  developing  countries  in the short  and 
medium-term. 
9.  Its Conseguences  for  Devel.opine;  Countries  - In general,  the 
recent  food  shortages  and  steep increases  in  food  prices have  caused 
not  only  economic  dislocation but  also  serious  social,  and political 
unrest  in  many  developing  countries,  where  higher  food  prices typically 
mean  higher  chances  of hunger  or malnutrition  for  the  bulk of the 
population.  Many  food  d~ficit developing  countries have  simply been 
priced  out  of world  markets  at  a  time  when  food  aid levels have  been 
cut,  i~ some  cases  dras~~cally 1  and  there  remains  the serious  doubt 
whether  sufficient supplies  are available at  the  world  level to  meet 
any major  emergencies  which  might  arise in the  near  future. 
10.  Even  more  important,  such  food  production  increases  as  seem 
to  be  feasible  in  many  developing  countries  in the  medium  term  are 
not  likely to  be  sufficient  to  cover  the  expected  increases in  food 
demand  by  their populations.  As  a  result,  the  food  import  requirements 
of developing  co~ntries as  a  whole  are  likely to  increase significantly 
in the  next  5-10 years,  as  indicated in FAO  commodity projections  up 
to  1980  summarized  in the  attached Memorandum.(l) 
II.  THE  COMMUNITY'S  RESPONSABILITIES 
11.  It would  be  highly inequitable 1  as  well  as  dangerously short-
sighted  on  the  part  of the  industrialized countries,  and  more  particu-
larly of Europe,  to  allow  a  situation in which  the  weaker  members  of 
the world  community  of nations  should  consistently be  those  that are 
forced  to  bear  the  additional burdens  caused  by  rapid  changes  on  the 
world  economic  scene.  It must  therefore  be  hoped  that  the near  future 
will  mark  a  decisive  step  forward  in the world's  sense  of responsibi-
lity for  dealing with  such  anomalies. 
./. 
(l)  See  paras.  3  and  4·  of the  Mem·orandum. 4. 
12.  Since  food  products  in  question are produced  largely in 
the  developed  countries  of the temperate  zone,  it is essential  for 
the latter countries  to  take  account  of the  rising  food  import  needs 
of the  Third  \vorld  to  prevent  its populatior;s  from  suffering  a  further 
reduction  in the  already  inadequate nutritional standards.  It must  be 
hoped  in particular that  the international community will be  moving 
towards  a  more  rational policy of management  of  food  supplies  on  a 
world  wide  basis,  including the  world  food  security policy  (as  proposed 
by  FA0) 1  and  some  degree  of international co-ordination of national 
production policies.  In this context,  the  Community  cannot  remain 
passive,  and  must  be  ready  to  show  example  and  take  appropriate policy 
initiatives,  consistent with  its obligations  towards  developing  countries, 
imposed  on  the  enlarged  Community  by  its immense  economic  power.  This 
is all the  more  important  in the  present  period when  we  deplore  the 
impact  of  sudden  increases in oil prices  on  the  economies  of the poorest 
developing  countries,  while  seemingly  ignoring  comparable  effects  on 
such  countries  of steep.price  increases  in their vital  food  imports. 
If ever,  the present  is the  time  for  Europe  to  affirm its concern with 
this situation. 
13.  Greater Stability vf  Commodity  Markets  - And,  it is very 
much  to  be  desired that tte  forthcoming  negotiations  in  GATT  and  possibly 
in other bodies  should  lead to  a  formulation  of more  rational trade 
policies,  resulting in greater degree  of market  stability for  basic 
food  products  throughout  the  world.  A  larger  number,and  a  more  effective 
character of international commodity  arrangement~ is  one  bbvious  means 
of promoting this objective.  There  is no  doubt  that  the  Community  has 
an  essential role  to  play in the  processes  v1hich  ensure  a  greater  degree 
of stability in  international markets;  several statements have  already 
been  made  in this respect,  and  proposals  to  this  effect  will  be  forth-
coming  shortly. 
14.  Availability of  Su~plies - It is to  be  hoped  that  in the  long 
run  food  production  in  developing  countries will grow  sufficiently, 
though  there  remains  a  problem  of meeting their  food  deficit  in the 
short- and  medium-term.  There  is no  doubt  that  the agriculture of 
western  Europe  has  a  technical  capacity  for  meeting  at  least part  of 
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that  deficit.  Western  Europe  is a  large producer of  basi~ foodstuffs, 
some  of which  (like  dairy products)  are  a  valuable  source  of much  needed 
.  .  th  d  l  .  t  .  ( 1 )  protel.ns  1n  e  eve  op1ng  coun  rl.es.  -
15.  Financial Assistance  - Without  a~y question,  part  of the  pros-
pective  food  deficit  of the  developing  ~ountries can,  and will continue 
to  be,  met  through  commercial  purchases,  provided that  food  is available 
at  reasonable prices  in the world  markets~  However,  even  under  most 
optimistic  assumption  concerning  future  export  earnings  of the  develo-
ping  countries,  these  are  not  likeiy to  be  large  enough  to  pay  for  the 
required  food  imports  in their entirety.  Consequently,  a  large,  and 
possibly growing  part  of their  food  deficit will have  to  be  met  through 
foreign assistance. 
16.  The  Community  is required at  the present  time  to  adopt  wide-
ranging  decisions  on  financial  assistru1ce  to  the  developing  countries. 
The  Commission  is  conscious  that  its proposals  on  food  aid  fit  into the 
broader  framework  of this assistancet  and  must  be  in conformity with 
the  overall objectives  of the  Community  towards  the third world.  It 
may  be  observed  in the  present  context  that  a  part  of the  Community's 
financial  aid to  the  developing  countries  could usefully be  spent  on 
structural  improvements  in their  food  production sector,  since  such 
improvements  alone  can provide  a  satisfactory long-term  answer  to the 
critical  food  problem  which  faces  them. 
17.  Food  Aid  Policy of  t~e Communitl- In order to  live  up  to  its 
responsabilities,  the  Community  must~  therefore,  have  a  recourse  to  a 
food  aid policy,  at  least during  the  next  5-10 years.  In fact,  if one 
goes  along  with  the  FAO~s view·  of the  future,  one  finds it difficult  to 
see  how  the  Community  could  refuse  to mobilize  developmental  resources 
in the  form  of a  substantial and  coherent  food  aid policy,  bearing in 
mind  the  existing productive  capacity of the European  agriculture  in  com-
modities  that  could  assure  a  suitable  food  aid basket  for  a  guaranteed 
number  of years. 
(1)  In  fact>  vJcstern  'Europe  is  in the process  of becoming  net  exporter 
of dairy products,  at  a  time  when  some  of the major  traditional 
exporters  among  the  developed  countries  (e.g.  the  United States) 
are  shifting to  a  net  import  basis. 
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18.  The  Community  has  the possibilities  for  undertaking  a  more 
ambitious  food  aid policy of its  own  which  would  provide  for  : 
- a  continuity of  food  aid  supplies  from  one  year to another  by  means 
of  a  '(five)  (three)  year  indicative  programme  to  be  implemented  by 
firm  annual  commitments,  both  expressed  in quantitative terms; 
a  diversified  food  aid basket,  selected in relation to  the  nutritional 
requirements  of developing  countries  and  the  Community 1s  normal  product 
availabilities;  and 
an  increase  in its present  size. 
19.  The  main  principles  along  which  a  desirable  food  aid uolicy of the 
( l  )  . 
Community  could  be  formula~2d and  implemented,  include  ;  · -· 
- open market  sales of the  Community's  food  aid,  except  in  emergencies, 
and  in cases  o~ aid  aimed  at raising  nutritional standards  of specific 
population  groups; 
- the utilization of the  resulting counterpart  funds  not  only  in the 
context  of specific  development  projects,  but  also  in support of easily 
identifiable sectol"i3  or  sub-sectors  o'f well  functioning  development 
plans  or  programmes; 
- the  channeling  of the  bulk of the  Community's  food  aid  directly 
to  developing  countries,  while  passing substantial,  and  possibly 
increasing;quantities  through  multilateral agencies,  notably WFP  and 
Red  Cross;  and 
the  authority to  be  given to  the  Commission  to  take  executive  decisions, 
if necessary with  the  assistance  of  governement  experts  on  development 
and  co-operation matters. 
20.  Up  to  no1t1,  the  Community's  food  aid has,  in the  caseof cereals, 
taken  the  form  partly of actions  by  the  Community  itself,  and partly of 
those  by  the  States.  Food  aid  in other products  has  been  implemented 
through  Community  actions  alone.  To  go  further  in  developing  the  role 
of the  Community,  it would  seem  desirable also  to  adopt  a  principle that 
all future  food  aid?  including that  in  cereals,  should  take  the  form  of 
Community  actions.  The  reasons  are  these  of  coherence,  efficacity,  and 
close  relation between  the  food  aid  policy of the  Community,  and its 
(1)  These  principles  are  stated in greater detail in the  attached 
Hemorandum. 
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commercial  and  agricultural policies which  are of a  community  character. 
21.  However,  since  national actions  amount  at  present  to  about 
700.000  tons,  some  Member  Sates  - while  favouring  a  progressive  communita-
rization of  food  aid  - may  not  be  prepared  for  an  immediate  drastic  cut  in 
their national actions.  Should that  be the  case,  the bilateral actions of 
Member  States would  in the transitory stage  fall within the  limits of the 
indicative  programme  (i.e.  between  1.700.000 and  2.500.000 tons). 
22.  Quantitative  proposals  for  the  first  indicative three  year pro-
gramme  to  be  carried out  through  Community  actioris  alone,  are  shown  in 
(1)  the Table  below  •  The  firm  supply  commitments  would  be  determined  annu-
ally within  the  indicated limits,  in the  light of circumstances prevailing 
in  a  particular year. 
Product 
Cereals 
Skim  Milk 
Powder 
Butter-Oil 
Sugar  (1) 
Other 
Products  (2) 
Indicative  Programme  (1974/75-1976/77) 
(Range  of Annual  Commitments) 
Minimum  Maximum 
Commitment  Commitment 
(Tons)  (Tons) 
1,  700, OC-/ (6)  2,500,000  ( 6) 
(1,000,000)(7)  (1,800,000)(7) 
8o,cioo  120,000 
45,000  65,000 




580,000  (3) 
(1~287,000)(3) 
80,000  ( 4) 
45,000  (4) 
6,000  (5) 
(l)  The  Community's  food  aid  in sugar  would  be  directed to  the  poorest 
among  the  developing countries,  and  would  be  used mainly in  furthe-
ring nutritional objectives,  such as  those  underlying  UNRWA  operations. 
(2)  A cash  component  for their acquisition  (to  balance  the  "basket"  from 
a  nutritional point  of view)  which  would  range  between the  minimum 
limit  of  20,000,000  uc  and  30,000,000 uc. 
(3)  I.e.  45% of 1,287,000"tons which  represents total EEC  commitment 
under  International Food  Aid  Convention. 
(4)  Quantities  proposed  by  the  Commission  but  not  yet  approved  by the 
Council. 
(5)  Approved  by  the  Council. 
(6)  If all actions are  of  a  community  character. 
(7)  If a  part  of aid  continues  in  the  form  of national actions. 
(1)  And  the  tentative  cost  estimates of the  programme  are  shown  in the 
Financial  Annex  to  the  Memorandu·m. 
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23.  The  proposed  supply  commitments  for  the  1974/75  season,  and  the 
tentative cost  of the proposal,  based  on the recent  internal EEC  prices 
(net  of export  subsidies  where  appropriate),  are  given in the Financial 
Annex. 
24.  In  conclusion,  the Council  is requested to  approve 
- the  principle of the  medium-term  indicative  programme  of 3  years  within 
which  food  aid  commitmen~ of the  Community  will be  determined  on  an 
annual basis; 
the  size of the  first  indicative  programme  (l974i75-1976/77),  shown  in 
the  preceding Table; 
- the  size of the  annual  programme  1974/75,  representing the  lower  limits 
of the  indicative  programme  (summarized  in the Financial Annex  to  this 
document),  and 
- the  general  principles  for  implementing  the  Community's  food  aid 
policy,  stated in paras  19  and  20  of the  present  document,  and  explained 
in greater detail in the  attached Memorandum. H£1-~0:KA.HDUI-1  ON  FOOD  AID  POI,ICY  OF  TIU~  :E:UROPE!,N  ECOIW;.JIC  cm>:UNI'l'Y HEMORANDUt>'l  ON  FOOD  AID  POLICY  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOHIC  COMHUNITY 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.  For  a  number  of reasons,  mentioned  in the preceding  document 
(Food  Crisis  and  the  Community's  Responsibilities  towards  Developing 
Countries),  the  adoption  of a  substantial and  coherent  food  aid policy 
of the  Community is becoming  an  urgent  necessity.  The  present  paper 
elaborates  the  reasons,  and  suggests  the  general principles  along 
which  such  a  policy  could  be  formulated  and  implemented. 
2.  The  Commission  wishes  to  emphasize  the  importance  attached 
to  the  examination of its proposals 1  due  to  the  combination of factors, 
including  : 
- the  necessity of reacting  favourably to  be  appeals  of  the  Director-
General  of  FAO  for  a  world  food  security system,  of which  food  aid 
would  no  doubt  be  an  important  element; 
the  likelihood of  food  aid  becoming  once  again  a  subject  of  discus~ions 
during  the  forthcoming  trade negotiations,  similar to the  Kennedy 
Round  situation which  gave  rise to  International Food  Aid  Convention 
and  indirectly to  the  present  food  aid  operations  of the  Community; 
- the  need  for  a  positive contribution by  the  Community  to  the  World 
Food  Conference  to  be  held  in November  1974,  for  which  preparatory 
work  has  already begun;  and 
the  current  decline  in the  size  of the  food  aid  programmes  of the 
United States,  coinciding with  the  world  wide  scarcity of  foodstuffs. 
I. CASE  FOR  ADOPTION  OF  A  COHERENT  COMMUNITY  FOOD  AID  POLICY 
Rising  Food  Aid  Needs  of Developing  Countr~es 
3.  Because  of their rapid population  growth  and  the,  so  far, 
limited  success  of their 
11Green  Revolutionn,  the  food  import  require-
ments  of  developing  countries  - already considerable  - are  likely to 
I  ., . 2. 
climb  steeply in the  next  5-10 years.  According to  FAO  estimates,  from 
approximately $  4  billion in 1970;  they may  reach  about  $  7  billion by 
1980  (l)  (see  Annex  Table  1).  What  part  of the ·estimated  requirements 
of approximately %  7  billion  (1)  in 1980 is likely to  be  met  through 
commercial  imports  of the  developing countries,  and  what  is likely to 
be  the  size  of the  remaining  11effective  demand  gap11  ?  In line with 
FAO  calculations,  food  imports  on  commercial  terms  may  increase  by 
some  35  per cent  between  1970  and  1980  (2)  from$ 3,1 billion to 
between$ 4,3 and$ 4,8 billion  (see  Annex Table  2).  There  would  thus 
remain  a  residual  11effective  demand  gap 11  of between $  2,2 and  $  2,7 
billion at  1970 prices,  the latter figure  representing almost  40  per 
cent  of the  estimated  food  import  requirements  of developing  countries, 
and  nearly three  times  the  original level of$ 1,0 billion in 1970  (3). 
4.  Estimates  of this kind  are  bound  to  be  subject  to  a  wide 
margin  of  error,  but  they indicate in general  terms  the nature of the 
problem,  which  is the  growing  imbalance  between  food  production  and 
consumption  in the  developing  countries.  The  excess  of unsatisfied needs 
(1)  At  1970 prices;  at  the  most  recent  prices available,  the  figure  of 
$  7  billion would  have  to  be  at  least  doubled  (see  Annex  Tables  1 
and  2). 
(2)  In the  absence  of  information on  the  main  operational  factors  which 
might  be  expected  to  determine  the  level of  food  imports  on  commer-
cial terms  by  1980  (such  as  prospective  export  earnings,  movements 
in international  commodity prices,  and  development  priorities 
affecting the  allocation of  foreign  exchange  between alternative 
imported  goods),  FAO  assumed  that  the  level of real  GDP  was  the 
only  factor  influencing the  volume  of  commercial  food  imports. 
A  good  statistical relationship  was  obtained between agricultural 
imports  into  developing countries  and  their  GDP  in real terms, 
from  which it was  jr1ferred that  in 1970  each  one  per  cent  increase 
in  GDP  generated infrease  in agricultural imports  of 0,72 per  cent. 
This  coefficient  was  subsequently applied  to  the  commercial  im-
port  figures  of the  items  shown  in Annex  Table  l, and  use  was  made 
of the  GDP  gro\vth rates  in  FAO  agricultural  Commodity  Projections,. 
1970-1980~ 
(3)  Though  in the  conditions prevailing towards  the  end  of 1973  and 
beginning  of 1974,  no  forecast  of any  kind  can  be  made  with  respect 
to  the  future  balance  of  payments  position of the  developing  countrl$ 
./. 3-
over  supplies is  of  course  much  greater than  the  effective  demand  gap 
because  most  people  in developing countries  need  far  more  food  than 
they  can  affrird  to  buy.  From  a  purely nutritional point  of view,  for 
example,  requirements  of milk protein as  a  food  are  almost  unlimited. 
Thus,  if only about  half a  billion of undernourished  people  in the 
developing  world  were  to  get  a  daily ration of only 10  g.  of milk 
protein,  this  would  mean  about  5.5 million tons  of  skim  milk  powder 
annually,  i.e. nearly twice  the  present  total world  output  of this 
dairy product. 
5.  The  growing  imbalance  between  food  production and  consumtpion 
in  developing countries  can  be  met  in three  ways  other  than  by  further 
cutting  down  their  food  consumption standards.  Either  : 
(a)  developing  countries will have  to  divert  increasing  amounts  of 
their limited  foreign  exchange  earnings  from  capital  goods  and 
industrial  raw  materials  to  food  purchases,  or 
(b)  their  indigenous  food  production will have  to  increase  Rt  a  faster 
rate  than  assumed  in FAO's  projections,  which  is unlikely,  since 
the  current  world  wide  shortage  of fertilizers  and  other structural 
impediments  could  in  fact  make  FAO's  production projections  for 
1980 unduly optimistic  as  far  as  many  developing  countries are 
concerned;  or 
(c)  their  food  deficit will have  to  be  met  through  food  aid,  possibly 
on  an  increasing scale,  or  by  financial  aid. 
6.  Adopting  the  first  alternative would  slow  down  the  development 
process  in  countries  where  imports  of industrial products  are necessary; 
in  some  countries,  it  could  even  jeopardize  any  prospect  of  development, 
or  mark  the  beginning  of  a  recession.  The  second alternative would  be 
highly desirable,  and it is  in this  area that  financial  aid  and  technical 
assistance  of the  developed  countries have  a  most  significant  role  to 
play.  Unfortunately 1  due  to  various  obstacles,  a  rapid increase  of 
agricultural production  may  not  be  easy to  achieve  in the short- and 
medium-term  in  many  developing  countries. 
./  ~ 4. 
7.  In  conclusion,  this leaves  expanded  food  aid as  a  means  for 
meeting their rising  food  deficit  in the  next  5  to  10 years,  especially 
since  the  prospects of sufficiently large  increases  in the  financial 
aid  to  the  Third  World  are limited,  especially in view  of  the  recent 
additional difficulties of the  industrial countries,  resulting  from 
the  growing  energy crisis. 
Role  of  Food  Aid  in.Economic  Development 
8.  It is generally recognized  that  food  aid is not  a  sat~sfactory 
~ermanent solution to  the  food  problem  of developing  countries,  and  that 
it is essential  for  them  to  expand  their  own  agricultural  production. 
Nevertheless,  certain  uses  of  food  aid  contribute to  economic  development 
in ways  over  which  ther~ are  no  serious  doubts.  Famine  relief,  conti-
nuing  charity to  the  st~rving,  building up  national  reserve  stocks  as 
buffers  against  the  ord}nary vagaries  of supply in developing  countries, 
command  general support.  Again,  food  aid may  in the  _S,."l;2.E.:~.::-<::~~9:  .  ...!!!.~1!.;r!,­
termsprove  to  be  the  only •·my  domestic  supplies  can  be  supplemented  as 
a  means  of raising the  caloric  and  protein intake  of  a  rapidly growing 
but  seriously underfed population.  In all such  cases)  it will  be 
readily  conceded  that  social welfare,  productivity of workers,  and 
therefore  economic  development  is likely to  be  enhanced. 
9.  Moreover,  in the  absence  of  food  aid,  it is  quite  clear that 
many  developing  countries  would  nee:i to  devote  a  part of their  foreign 
exchange  resources  to  purchases  of  food  imports.  In fact,  for  develo-
ping  countries  111here  thF  shortage  of  food  is often the limiting factor 
to  accelerated  economic· development,  food  aid properly conceived  in 
respect  to  its timing,. pagnitud.e 1  and  comr::osi.tion  may  be  just  as  important 
as  other  forms  of aid. , h'henever  foreign  exchange  is the  factor restric-
ting the  use  of available  domestic  factors  of production and  whenever 
aid  in the  form  of  food.  can  be  said to  be  additional to  the  planned le-
vel  of  export  earnings:,: capital inflow and  other  forms  of aid,  it will 
serve,  in effect,  as  a  valuable  resource  for  the  country's  development. 
10.  It must  be  recognized  that  in so  far  as  food  aid  is  not 
absorbed  by additional. cowsumpcion  (i.e.  consumption  which  Hould  not 
have  ta~-\.en  place  in the  .. abse"1.ce  of  food  aid),  there is  ah.rays  a  danger 
.;. 5. 
of its displacing  commercial  exports  and  thus  of distorting the normal 
patterns  of international trade.  However  this  danger  can  be  reduced 
or  even  totally eliminated by strict observance  of the  internationally 
accepted  procedures  and  principles of Surplus Disposal  (1). 
11.  Also~  food  aid  can  reduce  the  returns  to  the  local  f2rmers  in 
receiving  countries  below  what  they might  otherwise have  been,weakening 
incentives  to  produce.  Obviously,  any  disincentive  to agricultural pro-
duction in  a  developing  country,  resulting  from  aid programmes,  would 
be  a  serious  disadv~ntage.  Here  again,  however,  the.,danger  can be 
reduced  by  careful  handling,  and  in particular by relating amounts  of 
aid  granted to total production  and  consumption  requirements  of the 
recipient  countries  and,  in  case  of open  market  sales,  by stipulating 
that  foods  received  should  not  be  sold below  normally  prevailing in-
ternal prices. 
12.  Generalizing  from  the  experience  of  the last 20  years,  it 
can  be  concluded  that  ~ number  of developing  countries  have  achieved 
a  rate of  development  1t1hich  it would  not  have  been possible  to  finance 
without  the  balance  of ;payments  relief equivalent  to  that provided  by 
food  aid.  The  latter made  it possible  to  pursue  their  development  plans 
with  less  risk of inflationary pressures  resulting  from  food  shortages, 
and  without  reducing  imports  of machinery  and  other  goo~essential to 
their development.  Food  aid has  led  to  an  expansion  of  employment 
greater than  would  have. otherwise  occured.  Also,  there is no  doubt  that 
food  aid has  provided better nourishment  for  vulnerable  groups  of 
the  p·opulation,  while  emergency  food  aid has  helped to mitigate the 
adverse  effects of natural disasters  on  the  progress  of development. 
(l)  Such  as  FAO  Principles  and  Guilding Lines  of Surplus  Disposal,  in-
cluding  procedures  for  notification and  reporting of  food  aid tran-
sactions,  for  the  establishment  of Usual  Marketing Requirements  (a 
condition  commitihg  the  recepient  countries  to  import  a  pre-determi-
ned  quantity  comm~~cially)  for  specific  types  of transactions,  and 
foi  intergovernmental  consultations  on  transactions  which  had  been 
identified as  J.ikd,y to  cause  harmful  interference  vJi th normal  pa-
ttern of production and  international trade.  ./. 5  bis. 
Deficiencies  of the  Present  EEC  System 
13.  As  part  of its contribution towards  freedom  from  hunger 
in the world,  the  European  Community  has  been  engaged in  food  aid 
operations since  1968.  In the  wake  of the  Kennedy  Round  of Negotiations 
the  Community  and  its member  States undertook  to  supply 1,035,000 tons 
of cereals annually to  the  developing  countries  for  a  period  of three 
years,  as part  of the International Food  Aid  Convention  concluded  in 
1967.  At  the  end  of this period  a  further  convention  was  signed 
in 1971  for  a  3  year  period,  and  currently the  food  aid  commitment 
of the  enlarged  EEC  in cereals totals 1,287,000 tona  for  1973-74, 
of which  45  per  cent  is dealt  with  by  Community  actions  and  55  per 
cent. ~y national actibns of member  States. 
14.  With  the  pas~~ge of time,  the  Community  food  aid has  been 
extended  to  other pr6ducts  - powdered  skim  milk,  butter-oil,  sugar, 
and  powdered  eggs  - but  there  are  three  features  which  distinguish 
thii from  the  cereals aid.  In the  first place,  it is given  by  the 
Community  without  an~ prior international  commitment;  secondly,  it 
has  been  carried out:exclusively by  way  of Community  as  distinct 
from· national actions;  and  finally its size is  a  function  entirely 
of the  internal market  situation within the  Community,  which  may 
vary widely  from  one  year  to another. 
./. 6. 
15.  While  the  Community's  food aid operations have  grown,  and 
can  in their brief history be  credited with significant achievements,  parti~ 
cularly in emergency  situations,  they have  not  so  far amounted to a  purpo-
seful  food  aid policy.  They  have  in particular displayed such weaknesses  as 
16. 
their modest  quantitative  size in relation to food aid requirements of· 
the  developing world and to food aid programmes  financed by other 
developed countries;(l) 
their excessive  dependence  in the  case  of dairy products  on  the  common 
agricultural policy,  and on  the  unintentionally accumulated surplus 
stocks;  and  above  all 
their lack of advance  supply  commitments,  with  the  resulting difficul-
ties for medium-term  planning of  supplies  in  the  Community  and for 
their integration in the  development plans  and  programmes  of the  reci-
pient countries.  Their role  in this respect has  so  far been  that of 
mitigating shortages and enabling existing plans to  be  more  nearly 
fulfilled than of raising the  planned rate  of development. 
The  need to  remedy  these  deficiencies has  been emphasized 
on  several  occasions  oy  the European  Par1iament.  The  same  need was  reco-
gnized by  member  States  in  ~a:greeing that in future  "any  supplementary food 
aid programme  should be  organized more  systematically and on  a  more  regular 
basis  than  in  the  past,  while  at the  same  time  being better adapted to  the 
l  f  .  .  t  •t  .  n( 2)  development  p  ans  o  rec~p~en  coUl1  r~es . 
The  Community's  Capa_city  for Expanding Food Aid 
17.  The  Community  has  an  overall  capacity for undertaking a  food 
aid policy better adapted  to  the  needs  of the  developing countries and to 
its international responsibilities.  It has acquired a  good deal  of experience 
in this field,  and it is a  large  producer of  basic--foodstaffs.  The  Community's 
present -volillne- of aid in cereals is modest  (l per cent)  in relation to total 
------------------- .. ; .. 
(l)  The  current  Community  food.  aid in cereals of 580,000  tons  for  1973-74, 
forming  part of the  total  commitment  of  the  Community  and its.memberState?. 
of 1,287,000 tons,  compares \vitli.the  total of 16 millioa tons  p.a.  of 
cereal aid from  all  so_urces_ in  r~ecen~· Y._ears,- ~ncluding saies on_conc_es..:. 
· · sional  term-s. 
( 2)  Repcirf of the  l'Jo:rld.ng -Pa:rty on  Development  Cooperation,  Brussels, 
19  June  1973,  page  72. 7· 
cer·eal  production of over  100 million  tons  in the  Community  of Nine ( ~) 
The  same  is true of dairy products,  in the  case  of which  the  Community  is at 
pr·esent  :faced  ~rith  a  structural tendency to surplus production. 
1  p 
~v.  It has 1Jeen  sU(~Gesied in ·[;orne  qum~ters that a  substantial foo(l 
aid policy of the Comrnunj::<y  might  contrib:.J.te  towards  higher agricultural 
production than  viouJ.d  other;-:ise be  desirablo~  HcMever 7  this need not 
happen at all,  considering tb.e  relatively small  size of the proposec'c  !'ood 
aid.  commitments  in relation to  c);roduction,  and the fact that agrioul  tural 
prod.o.tction  in Eu.ro:-,e  is l;::,rt>;ely  ~;-;fluenced by tec'lmological  and  structural 
fac:·to:r·s o 
19.  The  Community  i·~a.s  c:Alf-inteTest  in adoptin,c;  a  sizeable  anri 
continuing  food  aid commitment  towards  the  Third. Horld.  This would  offe::· 
various advantages of a  political and  economic  character,  including 
creation of  a  major  instruJT.ent  of  the  enlarged Community's  global  policy 
towards  developing co1mtries,  currently under  discussion in line with  the 
mandate  received from  the  Summit  Conference  of October 1972; 
generation of  good 1..rill  among  developing countries as  a  whole,  and espe-
cially among  the  non-associate  countries,  some  of which  are  runong  the 
most  populous  and worst  :fed.  in the ;,orld; 
encouragement  given  to  commercial  exports of agricultural and,  possibly 
also  of non-agricultural  prod.ucts( 2)  from  member  States,  in line with the 
experience  of  some  tradi  t:ional  food  aid.  donor  countries;  a..."ld 
bringing the  public development  assistance  contributions of the  member 
States closer  to  the  goals of the  2nd Development Decade. 
.  .  I .. 
(1)  If it 1vere  considered,  for  example,  that  food aid should bear  a  specific 
relationship  to  the  donor's  food  productive  capacity,  the  Community's 
cereal  production of  104  mi.llion  tons  (compared with  over  395  million tons 
produced by all major  donor·  countries)  would  suggest  a  maxi:num  food aid 
level for  the  Community  and member  States of 4  million  tons  p.a.;  i.e. 
about  one  fourti1  of the  overall  volume  of food aid in cereals,  of appro-
ximately  16  million tons p.a.  (including concessional sales). 
( 2)  In  so  far as  fr-ee  grants of  1  for  example,  skim milk  powder  for  purposes 
of dairy  deve1,)pment  in recipient  countries would in due  time  create  a 
commercial  derr.t:l.nd  for  dairy plant  equipment  from  the  same  sources. 8. 
20.  Above  all,  the adoption of a  substantive European  food aid 
policy,  motivated partly by humanitarian considerations,  would  go  a  long 
way  to  improve  the Community's  image  in the world at large,  as well as 
in the European public  opinion.  In addition,  the Community  Hould find 
itself setting a  pattern  o~behaviour for other developed countries to 
follov"'. 
II.  SALI~TT FEATURES  OF  THE  PROPOSED  POLICY· 
2L  A desirable food  aid policy of the  Community  HO'J.ld  need to be 
related primarily to the  objectives of the Community  in the Third Horld, 
while taking account  of product availabilities resulting from  the  common 
agricultural policy,  the  Ll.tter factor being  one  of means  rather  than  ends 
of the proposed policy. 
22.  Its overriding objectives would be to  ensure that  a  \!Jell 
diversified  food  aid ·basket  could  be  macle  available at  a  time  and place 
Hhere  it might  be  most  needed,  that the basket  would  be  large  enough to 
have  an  impact  on  development  planning,  and that  at  a  time  of short 
supplies,  such as the present,  the poorest  countries of the vlOrld  'l'i'Ould 
not  be left to  starve. 
(a)  Characteristics  of the  Communitv's  Pronosed Commitments 
23.  Continuity of Food  Aid  Supplies  - To  alloH for  rational plannin,:; 
of the continuity of  supplies,  and for fon-rard  guidance to developing 
countries·  and to ciifferent  client  organizations,  the  Commission  proposes 
the  establishment  of  a.  mediurn·-term  3  year  ·indicative 
pro  csra.mme.  T'hi s  pro::;ramme  HOulrl  provide  a  broad  frame1·rork  for determining 
the  Community's  annual  food aiu contribution.  Since  food  aid needs  may  vary 
from  one  year to  anot'hery  the indicative medium-term  programme  NOUld  be 
expressed as  ran,:;es  for  each product.  To  avoid the distorting effects of 
price  changes  on  food  aid availabilities,  the  range  limits would  be  set 
in terms  of minimum  and maximum  !:@anti ties. 
(l) Reauests  are  bein-;  received by  the  Community  from  developing countries 
for multi-annual  food  aid undertakings  1·1hich  could -oecome  a  significant 
element  in their development  planning. 9· 
24.  The  actual size of annual  commitments  would  not  automatically 
increase  in the  course  of the  programme  period  from  the  minimum  to 
maximum  levels,  but  would  be  determined  in the light  of  circumstances 
in  a  particular y("ar,  though  no  annual  commitment  Hould  be  inferior to 
the  indicative  mi.r~imum  limit  for  the  programme  as  a  whole. 
25.  Proposals  concerning  annual  allocations  of the  Community's 
food  aid  among  countries  and  organizations would  be  prepared  in  close 
co-operation with  the  appropriate  international bodies.  In particular, 
the  ~uidance of  FAO  would  be  sought  concerning  the size  and  nature  of 
the  expected  demand  for  food  aid  in  any particular year  or  region. 
26.  Cc11tir.u.i ty  of  :;uppL:  ..  :::s  from  one  year  to  another  presupposes 
the  existence  of  stocl-:holding policies  foj~  the  proci1Jc;~.s  cotJcerned. 
Ideas  to  this  effect  have  been  recently  formulated 
'1:  ..l.  I.'  {"'  ~  •  Gj  ~ue  vDmm~SSlOn 
in  the  case  of soft  whe.·at  (l)..  .Sirni1ar  provis·i.or,s  mny  h:;v0  to  be 
adop'cr:d  also  fo:c  other  components  of the  Community'n  food  a.idHbasket 11(2). 
27,  Diversified  Food  Aid  Basket  - The  food  aid  "basket 11  of the 
Community  might  include  two  categories  of products.  First,  there  would 
be  a  limited  number  of  commodities,  selected in relation to  the nutri-
tio~al requirements  of  developing  countries  and  the  Community's  normal 
product  availabilities.  As  in the  past,  these  would  include  cereals 
(notably ·wheat  a.nd  rice  (3);  skim  milk  pov1der;  and  butter  (notably in 
the  form  of butteroil).  Moreover,  since the  Community  has  been recei-
ving  requests  for  :food  aid in sugar,  some  modest  quantities  of sugar 
could  also  be  included  (aee  par.  60).  These  products  would  form  the 
hard  con::  of  the  "basket"" 
(l) Modification  of the  Common  Agricultural Policy  - Memorandum  of the 
Commission  to  the  Council  COM(73)  1850,  31  October  1973. 
(2)  It  might  at  some  stage  be  necessary  in this  connection  to  decide  : 
\vhat  constitutes  an  adequate  minimum  stock level  in the  Community; 
ho\·l  large  is the  no:::mal 
11 ~Jipeline
11  component  of  the  stock;  what 
should  be  cons:i.dc:red  e  ":;::..cryover 11  element  of stocks  to  be  kemp  in 
rN;erve  ~·rom  one  )'eer  t.)  L<:-::.other;  and  v1hat  part  of the  latter should 
be' earmarkerl  fo:l'  food  aid :pm:poses;  broken  down  by  nnormal1 '  and 
~iemergenc:;ln  ~'Jurpo:3ese> 
(3)  ~arger quantitied  of rice  would  in  future  be  earmarked  as  food  aid, 
in  vinw  of ttc  consumer  preference  for  rice  in  many  developing 
countries,, 
./. 28.  Secondly,  there  might  be  a  group  of other products  which 
have  from  time  to  time  proved useful  in various  food  aid  schemes, 
especially in  emergencies,  such  as  processed cereals,  egg  powder, 
etc •••  Occasionally,  these  could be  added  to  balance  the  11basket'' 
10. 
from  a  nutritional point  of view,  but  they would  not  be  subject  to 
medium-~·erm quantitative programming.  Instead,  a  fixed  cash  component  would 
be  set  aside  for  their acquisition,  internally or  in world  markets,  as 
and  where  the  need arises. 
29~  Increased Size  of the  Commitment  - The  size of the 
Community's  own  food  aid actions  ~excluding national actions)  would 
thus have  to be  related to  the  quantitative  and  qualitative needs  of the 
developing  countries,  to  the  Community's  productive  capacity,  and 
to  the  size of the  food  aid  programmes  of other major  donor  countries. 
There  is no  question of the  Community being able  financially to  meet 
fully  or  even  largely ,the  gap  created by  the  projected increase  in 
food  requirements  of developing  countries.  In practive,  moreover, 
the  amounts  of  food  aid which  could be  absorbed without  damage  to 
agriculture in the receiving countries or to  world trade  would  almost 
certainly be  less  than those  indicated in FAO  projections.  However,  if 
the  Community's  food  aid policy is to have  the  desired impact,  its 
present  volume  would  have  to  be  significantly increased. 
Principles of  Food  Aid Utilization in Recipient  Countries 
30.  Onen  Iviarket  Sales  - As  a  method  of  financing  economic  develop.:.c. 
ment,  open  market  sales of  food  aid should be  distinguished  from  the 
food  in kind  distribution to specific groups  of population,  as  practiced 
by the  World  Food  Programme  and  based,  for  example,  on  a  calculation of 
the  food  required  to provide  a  dietary supplement  to  less  favoured  cate-
gories of people,  and  to  workers  engaged  on  a  particular project. 
31.  From  the point  of view  of the recipient  countries,  open 
market  sales increase  government  funds,  and  do  not  require the recipient 
./. 11. 
gover~nent to  assume  extra administrative and financial  burdens~l)  In 
many  developing  cou:c,tries,  administrative capacity is at  a  premium,  and 
distribution in kind  ma.~es heavy demands  on this scarce resourceo 
32.  Certainly,  open market  sales represent  a  simpler and  less 
expensive  v.;ay  of handling food  aid,  a.s  well as  one  that is more  vrelcome 
to developinr;  cou.YJ.tries  themselves.  They  are the most  widely used  form  of 
food  aid distribution,  and have  accounted for the  bulk of all food  aid 
channelled to developing countries since the  beginning of the United 
StatesiP.L,.  4?,0  in the  early 50's.  Far from  hurting recipient countries, 
the  open market;  sales techx1ique  has  been successfully used in ihe past 
economic  gr01-rth~ 
33·  On  the other hand,  the distribution in kind  approach  can 
be  said to  reduce the risk of harmful  interference with international 
trade and  production in recipient  countries in so  far as  food  aid is given 
away  directly,  rri thout  passing through marketing channels.  However,  even 
though  open market  sales  may  a  priori produce  adverse effects in recipient 
countries  or on third party interests,  such effects  can be  avoided if 
suitable precautions are taken1  as mentioned  in paras ll and  12  above. 
34.  Consequently  1  direct  food  aid.  of the Community  should as 
a  general  principle continue to  be  sold in the  open markets  of recipient 
countries,  except  in emergencies,  in aid transactions aimed at  raising 
nutritional  standards  of particular groups  of the population,  as well 
as  in some  projects or programmes  mentioned  in para 41  belo>v. 
(1)  E~g.  of developing  individual  schemes,  or of their extraction from 
an overall development  programme;  the preparation· of specific food 
budgets;  the receipt,  storage,  transportation,  ar..d  ph,ysical distri-
bution of  food  to  end users;  the  separation of these activities for 
specific supervision;  the provision of the necessary non-food  resources, 
separate audit,  inspection,  verification,  and  evaluation. 12. 
35,  Utilization of Com1terl?_a::.·t  F'undo  - The  counterpart  funds  in 
local currencies,  resulting from  the  open market  sales of the  Community's 
aiel  should be  placed in a  special  account  a..'1.d  utilized in the context  of 
specific  development  pro,j ects or proeramiTtes  selected by  developing- countries 
and.  a.,:;reed  by  the  Community prior to the delivery of food  aid,  in line 
v;i th pre-esta.blished general criteria. In  exceptional  cases1  the recipient 
countries mic;ht  b"'  allcn-1eC.  to use  local currency funds to cover recurnmt 
expenses  of the food  aid projects or programmes  in question.In  general 1  priority 
should  be  given  to  project.s  and  programmes  which  encourage  increased agri-
cultural  p~·oduction  i:'."l  b;.e  recep~~e:.:d~  couutrier;, 
~-;6~  Thi-3·  Gommuni ty shottld  co1~t~in1.te  1eavi;Jg all 
d.v;_;  s5.~~;:s  on the  t:i.min:;  oi:'  ·'·;;- ''"  expen  .. ~l. ~urr::  of counterpart  fm1ds  to  ti1e 
recipient  governments  themseJ.ves.  'I'bis  i1})pro2..ch  is clearly r:1ore  enlightened, 
and  prob<=tbl.y  also more  realistic than that ·.mderlyin{;'  some  other forms  of 
food.  aid dist ri  but  i. "tl,  si  nee  it is usually the control measures  over 
project  choice,  release of counterpart  funds,  and  end--use  supervision tho.t 
complicate adrninistration,  increase red tape,  and  cause  most  friction 
behreen recipient  COi.<:rtries  and.  bilateral agencies• 
37.  In many  cases,  it would  be  a  mistake to regard the creation of 
counterpart  funds  as  an,ythin.<s  more  than an  accounting- device"  They  do  not 
constitute a  real development  resource  in as  much  as the  only increase in 
the real resources available to the  o.id  receiving  COill1.try  consists in extra 
supplies  of  food.  The  extent  of the benefit  depends  on  how  far the  country 
takes advantage  of the  presence  of these  products to step up  the rate 
of development. 
38 •.  At  the  same  time,  in  some  cases  local currency counterpart 
funds  may  represent  a  useful  source of finance  especially in countries 
having d:i.ff'icul'ty  in raising sufftcient  funds  for  a  development  purposes 
through more  conventional methods.  They  ma;y  also  have  a  certain advantage 
from  the recipient  countries  1point  of vimv  in being limited in 
o  o/ o  • 13. 
amount  to  the  value  of extra foods  from  which  they originate.  Finally, 
there  is some  justification for  the  donor  authority having a  minimum  of 
control  over  the  use  of funds,  so  as  to  ensure  that they are  not  used 
for  other than  genuine  devt~lopment purposes. 
39.  In an  economically more  advanced country1  the  tying up  of 
counterpart funds  to  individual  development  projects is not  r.oc;essary 1 
and may  in fact be  both wasteful  (since  keeping track of project fulfillmant 
is in  these  circumstances  less important  than evaluating the  programrr.e  as 
a  whole),  and  unduly restrictive of  the  uses  to  which  the  Communj_ ty food 
ai·i cou::.d  be  put  constructive:~y.  In  these  conditions,  counterpart  funds 
tors.  This  is the  progra%~e approach,  widely applied by major bilateral 
donor  countries. 
4C  In countries without  reasonably  comprehensive  development 
programmes,  the  project approach may  be  more  appropriate.  Clearly,  the 
Community  should keep its options  as.to whether it wishes to Rpply 
the  project  or  programme  approach  in particular cases.  It would  be  undesi-
rable  to limit the  use  of  counterpart  fu.'1ds  to  financing  individual  pro-
jects,  as has  been the case 11p  to  no1·r.  Obviously 1  in cases  ~o:here food aid can 
be  used to  support  well  prepared and 1::ell  functioning development  pro-
grammes,  the  future  range  of counterpart fund uses  should,  in addition, 
include  possibilities of  sale  proceeds  in local  currencies 
(a)  financing relatively self-contained and easily identifiable sectors 
or sub--sectors  of a  development  plan or  programme,  such as rural 




(b)  being tied to  a  suitable  group of inter-disciplinary projects with 
a  common,  clearly defined developmental  objective,  such as  the 
.. ; .. 
(1)  An  exa.'Tiple  of successful  application of counterpart  funds  in  this 
situation  h;:-..s  l;:;een  the  Rural  V.iorks  Programme  in Pakistan,  financed partly 
out  of government  funds  and partly from  the  counterpart funds  generated 
by  the  United States P.L.  480  supplies.  The  programme  was  generally 
intended to  explore  those  areas where  encouragement by  the  Government 
could help meeting the  local  requirements  through  self-help.  The  Pro-
gramme,  which has  now  lasted for  10 years,  has  been particularly  succes-
sful  in  the  areas  of  irrigation,  road building,  bridge  construction, 
and flood  control  and more  generally in  linking the village life with 
the  mainstream  of development activity. setting up  of national food  reserves,  or various  commodity  deve-
lopment  schemes  of the type  promoted by FAO,  etc •••  (l) 
Community's Food  Aid Distribution 
Ln.  Direct  Aid  Indirect Aid  - The  Community  should give 
~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
most  of its food aid directly to developing countries.  One  reason is that 
the Community  is not  a  simple  intergoverrunental institution.  In the  eyes 
of the Horld,  it has  an  identity and  a  personalit:,• of its otm&  Its gro<:ing 
international responsibilities,  especially toNar-ds  developing countries, 
Here  spelled out  clearl;:r  b~r the Summit  Conference in Paris last  October. 
In principle,  the Community  assume  these responsibilities itself. ?ood. 
aid is an essential instrument  of development  co-operation currently 
available to the Community  in regard to non-associated developing  com~tries(
2 ) 
Since the Community  receives more  and more  requests for direct  food aid 
from  such countries,  and because this tendency is likely to grow  in 
future,  it is only proper that the  Community  should give priority to 
such requests. 
42.  At  the  s~~e time,  the Community  should channel  substantial, 
and possibly increasing,  quantities through multilateral institutions, 
notably l'IFP  t'lfhich  is the specialized agency  of the United Nat ions  in 
matters  of food aid. Decisions concerning the distribution of the  Commu-
nity's food  aid as  between direct  and indirect actions will be taken 
bearing in mind  the relative merits of each method~ 
(1)  Such  as  the  International Scheme  for Co-ordination of Dairy Development, 
or International I·:Ieat  Development  Scheme,  currently lau.<'1ched  by FAOo 
The  use  of the  Community's  food  aid in support  of the dairJ and 
livestock development. schemes  viOuld  be  especially desirable as  a  means 
of combatting the  existing scarcity of animal proteins in the diets 
of the developing countries. 
(2)  For a  geographic distribution of the Community's  food  aid operations 
in cereals see Annex  Table 7. '+3.  The  existence of international or,\!anizations  specialized in 
other forms  of development  assistance  (such as UliDP,  IBRD,  etc •••  )  has 
not  freed the  Community  from  its obligation to Hark  out  and  implement  its 
O\m  policy,  in accordance  with its own  objectives and rules.  The  same 
should apply to  food aid.  To  act  otherv;ise  >·IOuld  amount  to vii th.h.olding 
a  major  instrument  of development  assistance. 
Policy 'l'o1,mrds  the  Ho:rld  Food  Programme  - 'l'he  approaches  of 
the  Community's  and  WB'P's  in matters  of  food  aid  result  in 
sisnificant  differences  for  the  distribution  of  food  aid  on 
,,-,,  .~··:Jo.::;raphic  basis"  Tims,  the grantin:; of the  Community's  aid.  depends 
prima:::-ily  on the  overall need.  of  a  cuurl"cry  :::'or  the  product  concerned.i 
account  being taken primarily of its internal  supply/demand situation, 
the degree  of its development,  its balance  of  payments  position,  and the 
existence of alternative aid supply sources.  On  the other hand,  the 
concession of the  TJJFP' s  project aid,  while taking account  of the  above 
considerations,  places particular emphasis  on the ability of recipient· 
conntries to meet  the .o:roject  requirements  of the HF?,  though it: is often 
possible  in this 1·:ay  to reach directly the most underpriviliged groups 
in the population. 
45.  As  a  result  of this complementarity of approaches,  the  HFP 1 s  project Bid 
has  up toW:!  tenG.:cd  to  be  concentrated in countries Hith relatively advanced 
infrastructure,  offering a  reasonable  assurance of meeting the project's 
pre-conditions,  1-lhile  the  Community's  direct  aid tends to favour  least 
advanced  countries in need  of food  aid primarily as  a  support to their 
balance of  pay~ents. For  example,  over 50  per cent  of the Community's 
total aid in 1972-73 has  been directed to the  least  developed group  of 
countries,  as  clefined  by the  U  .NG  At  the  same  time,  as  of  31  December 
1972,  only 14  per  cent  of all h'FP's  engagements  1-;ere  located in that 
group  of  COUl1tries 1  od-:ile  40  per cent  v1ere  to be  fou:'l.d  among  the  relatively 
ad.vanced  developing countries  of the  JITear  East  and  North  Africa~l)  The 
larsest recipient  of the  Community's  food  aid has  been  Bangladesh,  Hhile 
P.rn0<1g  the prominent  beneficiaries of the  ~~TFP' s  aid there are  such rela-
tively more  advanced developing countries as  Turkey,  Algeria,  Mexico, 
and  Colmnbia. 
• ./  0. 
( l)  See  Table  23  of the Annual  Report  of the Executive Director of  ~·lFP, 
HFP/IGC  :  23/5,  Add.  l,  I•Ia~c::  l'-l'?3. 16. 
46.  The  relations between  the  Community  and  WFP  .should continue 
to  develop  in the  s~irit of mutual  confidence, it being understood that 
(a)  the  principle of direct  actions is indispensable  to  the  Community 
for  reasons  stated above; 
(b)  the  open  market  sales of the  Community  are basically complementary 
to  the distribution in kind  schemes  of the  WFP;  and 
(c)  the  existence of direct  food  aid actions,side  by  side  with the multi-
lateral activities of WFP,  is in the  final  analysis of interest 
to  the  developing  countries  as  a  group. 
47.  In practice,  the best  form  of cooperation between  the  Commu-
nity and  WFP  would  be  to rely on  frequent  consultations  and  exchanges 
of information between their respective staffs.  This  is doubly  impor-
tant  where  bilateral and  multilateral  food  aid programmes  operate  side 
by side  in the  same  countries.  It would  be  desirable,  if provisions 
could  be  made  for  WFP  field personnel  (project  officers)  occasionally 
to  perform supervisory control  functions  over  the  Community  projects, 
and  if possibilities  could  be  explored of certain  joint ventures  in 
appropriate  circumstances.  In addition to  information  concerning  food 
quantities  to  be  channelled  through  WFP  in  any  given year,  reasonable 
indication~ should  be  given as  regards  prospects  for  the  fallowing 
year,  so  aD  to  enable  that  Organization to  plan better its operations. 
48.Community  Versus  National Actions 
Up  to  now,  the  Community's  food  aid has,  in the  case  of cereals, 
taken  the  form  partly of actions  by the  Community itself,  and  partly of 
those  by the States.  Food  aid  in other products  has  been  implemented 
through  Community actions alone.  To  go  futher  in developing  the  role 
of the  Community,  it would  seem  desirable also  to  adopt  a  principle that 
all future  food  aid,  including that  in cereals,  should  take  the  form  of 
Community  actions.  The  reasons  are  these  of coherence,  efficacity,  and 
close  relation between the  food  aid policy of the  Community,  and  its 
commercial  and  agricultural policies which  are of a  community  character. 
However,  since national  actions  amount  at  present  to  about  700.000 tons, 
some  Member  States  - while  favouring  a  progressive  communitarization  of 
food  aid  - may  not  be  prepared  for  an  immediate  drastic  cut  in their 
national actions.  Sho~ld that  be  the  case,  the bilateral actions of 
Member  States  would  in the  transitory stage  fall within the  limits of 
the  indicative  programme  (i.e.  between 1.700.000 and  2.500.000 tons) • 
.  ; . 17. 
Procedural  and  Management  Aspects 
49.  The  food  aid policy requires  efficient  and  rapid procedures 
for  its implementation.  This  is why  it will be  essential to  re-allocate 
within  the  Community  the responsibilities  for  implementing  food  aid 
agreements  between  the  Council  and  the  Commission.  The  existing procedu-
res  are  not  adapted to  the  reguirements  of efficient management.Not  only 
the  broad questions  of principle but  also the smallest details of 
agreement  execution are  subject to Council  debate and approval. 
50.  In effect,  the existing procedures consist  of two  phases. 
First, the Council  takes  a  decision offering food aid to certain developing 
countries  and international organizations.  This decision allows  opening 
of negotiations 1-1i th the· ·country concerned.  Normally,  such a  decision is 
implicit in the Council's acceptance  of an annual  food  aid programme,  but 
in case  of emergency,  it is taken on an ad hoc basis as and when  the 
emergency  occurse  Secondly,  the Council must  also  approve the terms  of 
every agreement,  after its negotiation with the recipient country and inter-
national  organizations,  including such details as the nature of product, 
conditions of its distribution,  the proposed use  of counterpart  funds,  etc ••• 
51.  As  a  result,  several months  may  pass before the Council's 
decisions  can be  effectively implemented.  In effect,  after completing 
negotiations with the recipient  country and international organizations 
concerned,  it is necessary,according to the present  practice,  to bring 
the matter once  again before the Council to obtain a  decision authorizing 
the definitive  conclusion of the agreement. 
52.  The  Commission  considers that it would  be necessary to 
adopt  more  flexible  procedures·with a  view to  improving working efficiency 
and  shortening delays  in the  execution of the  Community  actions.  It is 
therefore  proposed that  in the future the Council  should decide  on the 
adoption of indicative medium-term  and  annual  programmes,  and on  allocation 
of the Community's  food  aid among  beneficiary countries and international 
organizations,  as  well  as  on  basic conditions underlying the distribution 
of the Community's  food  aid.  The  Commission would act  on behalf of the 
Community  vis a vis beneficiary countries and  international organizations 
as regards the definition of relevant  rights  and  obligations concerning 
implementation of actions decided by  the Council. 
53.  In discharging its functions,  the  Commission  should be 
~ssisted by  a  Committee  of the  type  of  a  Manage~~nt Committee,  consis-
ting of  member  States'  experts  on  development  and  co-operation,  fami-
liar Hith agricultural and  nutritional problem. 18. 
54.  Concerning  emer6ency  situations,  especially those relating 
to natural disasters and conflicts,  the Commission  envisages  a  two-stage 
procedure,  1.,rhereby  the Commission  itself : 
55. 
-would have  authority to decide  on the first,  limited amounts  of aid 
to  be  dispatched during the  early days  immediately follm-ring the 
disaster,  if necessary by air transport;  and it 
would  propose to the Council to take  a  decision - by the accelerated 
1·rri tt  en  procedure - concerning the dispatch of the remaining quan-
tities of food  aid. 
Expanding food  aid activities of the Community  would not 
require the creation of a  vast  executive structure.  The  basic approach, 
with its emphasis  on  programme  technique and  open market  sales,  is 
administratively simple  and does not  require elaborate machinery.  Nor 
\'rould it be necessar,y to outpost  staff in the receiving countries. As 
far as  associate countries of the Community  are  concerned,  the necessary 
follo1,.r  up  functions  tvould  be performed by FED  control delegates.  In the 
non-associate countries,  they would  be carried out  by  periodic field 
visits of the Community's  Headquarters staff,  supplemented,  as needed 
by the  information from  the  embassies of member  States,  which  t·J'OUld 
follm·r the  executi-on of agreements  in a  general tvay. 
III. PROPOSALS  FOR  THE  FIRST  INDICATIVE  AND  AJITNUAL  PROGRAWI:MES 
Indicative  3  Year  Programme  (1974/75-1976/77~ 
56.  In  the light  of the preceding considerations,  the  Commission 
proposes the adoption of a  three year  indicative  food  aid 
programme,  beginning Hith the 1974/75  season,  to be  carried out  through 
Community  act  ions  alorH:~.  The  proposed limits of the  programme  are 
shown  in the folloHing table. 
.  ./  .. Indicative  Programme 
(Range  of Annual  Commitments) 
Products 
Cereals 








l.  000. 000  ( 1) 






1.800.000  (1) 






Quantities  under 






(l)  national actions  (700.000 t)  to  be  added to  the  Community  totals 
(2)  in the  absence  of national actions 
(3)  minimum  and  maximum  commitments,  expressed  in value  terms  between 
20.000.000 uc  and  30.000.000 uc. 
57.  In the  case  of cereals,  the  lower limit  of the  Community's 
proposed  undertaking of 1,7 million tons p.a.,  (compared with  1,287,000 
tons  in 1973/74),  is  determined primarily by the  growing requests  for 
.::_; 
Community  aid  (already  exceeding  2  million tons  in 1973/74),  and  by the 
imminent  decline in  food  aid  programmes  of the United States  (l)  and  other 
donor  countries  (such  as  Japan).  The  upper-limit  of 2,5  million tons 
can,  in addition,  be  justified by the  exceptionally high  import  requi-
rements  of some  developing  countries,  and  by their unquestionable  difficul-
ties in meeting that  deficit  through  commercial  imports  as  well as  by 
the need  of a  large  number  of developing  countries to build  or re-
build their own  national  food  reserves,  following  the  events  of last 
year  and  appeals  to  this  effect  by FAO. 
. I. 
(l)  Bangladesh  alone  has  a  deficit  in cereals of close  to  2,5 million tons 
p.a.,  and  is  likely in the  next  fixe  years  to  need  food  aid of the 
order  of 2  million tons p.a. 20. 
58.  As  regards  skim  milk po>.;der,  the  propos~d indicative range 
would  be  of the order of  ( 80  to 120 thousand tons).  The  lovrer  limit 
corresponds to the amount  proposed as  food aid for 1974,  and falls far 
short  of the requests received.  The  higher limit is predicated on the 
disappearance  of the United States'concessional transactions in dairy 
products~  l)  It also takes account  of the rapidly growing  demand  for 
milk products in developing countries,  of the  special need for closing 
the "protein gap"  of the Third Horld1( 2)  and  of the particular suita-
bility of skim  milk potider  in emergency  situations.  Both limits are 
tiell belm'J'  the estimated absorptive capacity of the currently feasible 
dairy development  projects in developing countries,  estimated at 
(3) 
bet\ieen  250  and  300  thousand tons  and  below the peak level of 
dairy world food aid (bilateral and multilateral)  in the first half 
of 1960's,  ~'hen skim  milk pm-rder  shipments  averaged aro1mcl  250,000 
tons annually  o 
59  0  The  101-rer  limit of the proposed ra..'1ge  of butteroil of 
45,000  tons·  Gorresponds to the  amount  proposed for 1974.  The  upper 
limit  of 65.000  tons represents  a  conservative estimate of the 
absorptive  consumption capacity of the developing countries,  and  of 
technical possibilities of the European  indust~J to transform butter 
into butteroil. 
60.  For sugar,  the quantities  suggested are very small in 
relation to the needs  of developing countries.  The  Community's  food 
aid in  sugar 1.;ould  be  directed to the poorest  among  the developing 
countries,  and  would  be  used mainly  in furthering nutritional objec-
tives,  such as those underlying UNRl·fA  interventions. 
.  ./  .. 
(1) Due  to the United States turning structurally from  a  net  exporting 
to a  net  importing position for dairy products. 
(2) If only about  half a  billion of undernourished  people  in the deve-
loping rJOrld  1·1ere  to obtain a  daily ration of 10 grams  of milk protein, 
this vJOuld  mean  about  5,5 million tons of skim  milk po1-rder  annually, 
i.e. nearly twice the present total tiOrld  output  of this dairy product. 
(3)  See  Table  2,  l·~ilk  Products  as Food  Aid,  CCP  68/8/lo 21. 
The  1974-1975  Pro[jramme 
61.  In addition,  the  Commission  proposes to the  Council the 
adoption of the firm  supply  commitments  for the 1974-1975  scheme, 
representing the minimum  limits of the first  indicative programme,  as 
follows  : 
Cereals  1,000,000 tons  (1) 
1,700,000  "  (2) 
Skim  Milk Powder  80,000  " 
Butteroil  45,000  " 
Sugar  10,000  " 
Other Products  (3) 
62.  The  Commission  feels that vrhile these quantities are likely 
to be  far short  of the requirements  of the developing countries in 1974-
1975,  a  year of experience in operating the ne'tJ  programme  may  be neces-
sary before the quantities  commited  can be  raised to reflect closer 
the requirements of the developing countries. 
(1) National actions  (700,000 T)  to  be  added  to  the  Community  total 
(2)  In the  absence  of national actions 
(3) The  minimum  and  maximum  commitments  being respectively 20  Muc 
and  30  Muc. STATISTICAL  ANNEX 
TABlE  1  - Projected gro,,>th  of food  impor-t  requ,irements  in food deficit developing 
. countries,  1961-63  to 1980 
1961-63  1964-66 





Estimated volume  of imports needed  ( ••••••••• ·thousand metric tons  •••••••• ) 
Cereals  . 




J~ilk and  milk products  (a) 
Fats and  oils  (b) 
Sugar 
Meat 
Value  of imnort  requirements at 
1~170  prices  . 
Cereals 
Milk and  milk products  (a) 





23  320 
2  610 
5  550 
4  000 
11  160 
l  088 
1  040 








29  441  29  649 
2 814  3  693 
6  811  7  594 
4 703  . 5  387 
15  113  12  975 
3  767  5 089 
1380  1  934 
3  859  4  218 
541  685 
thousand million u.s.  ~ 
2.2  2.2 
0.3  0.4 
0.4  0.5 
0.4  0.5 
0.4  0.5 
'(ba)  in terms  of milk equivalent,·exoluding butter 
36  247 
5 382 
. 10  507 
9  418 
10  940 
19  770 
4  046 
5  174 
1  839 
.  ........ ) 
2.5  (6.1)(1) 
1.5  (2.2)(1) 
1;.1  (1.9)(1) 
0.6  (1.4) (1) 
1.3  (2.6)(1). 
7,.0  (14.2)  (1~ 
(  )  including butter 
(1)  at international prices prevailing during the last quarter of 1973 
Source  :  FAO  Estimates TABLE  2  - Estimation of the  r-a.E  betHeen  projected import  reauirenents 
and  commercial  importc  (at 1970 prices) 
1970  1980 
est.  projected 
(thousand  mi1l~on US~) 
Estimated overall  import  requirements 
Estimated  commercial  imports 
Economic  or "effective demand"  gap  1.0 
(a)  assuming  an import  elasticity of 0.72  in 1970 
(b)  assuming an  import  elasticity of 1.10 in 1970 
(c)  at pric8s prevailing during the last quarter of 1973 TAJ3IE  3 
AVAILABILITY  /JfD  UTILlZA'l)IOri  OF  \·~ 
IH THE  COj.;J.mJTITY  OF  11 SIX11 
1970/71 
Production 
Imports  (from  ontsicle EEC) 
Diminution of stocks 
TOTAL  AVAILABILITY 
1ilt<la.l:1  consumption 
Li  vestoc1::  feed ' 
Increase in stocks 
Other utilization 
Exports  (to outside EEC.) 
TCY.rAL  U'l'ILIZ!,TIOiT 
of \·:hich  828.000 tons  as food  aid 










Source  :  EUROSTAT- StatiEtiquo agricole 1/1973 
"" 
(1) 











37.284 TABLE  4 
AVAILABILITY  AND  ~'ILIZATION OF  DRY  SKI~IDlliD  MILK 
IN  E.E.C.  OF.  "SiX"  (1) 
1969/70 
Production  1.201 
Imports  (2)  170 
Diminution of stocks  61 
'I'OTAL  AVAILABILITY  1.432 
Human  consumption  296 
Livestock feed  689 
Increase  in stocks  -
Other utilization  ( 1)  I  85' 
Exports  (2) 
/  '  447 
I  'i'OTA.L  UTILJ?,A'l'ION  1.432' 
'  .... -- ··-~-------- -·-··--- ., 
I 
(1)  excluding Italy 
(2)  including intra EC 
(3) of which  25.000 t. food  aid  (1970) 
(4) of which  47.000 t. food  aid  (  1971) 
Source  OSCE  - Statistiques agricoles  1972  - n.  5 










(3)  596  (4 
1.462 TABLE  5 




Diminution of stocks 
Total availability 
' 
liuman  consumption 
Livestock feed 




(1) Of  which  14.000 t. food  aid  (1970) 
(2)  Of  which  14.000 t. food  aid  (1971) 
1969/70 
1.126 










Source  :  O.S.C.E.  Statistiques agrico1es -·1972- N.  5 










( 1)  180  (2) 
1.197 TABLE  6- AVAILABILITY  AND  UTILISATION  OF  SUGAR  IN  EEC-OF  "SIX11  (1) 
1.000 t • 
.::.:.;· 
1969/70  1970/71 
Production 
~ 
7.012  7.040  (3) 
Imports  (2)  1.136  -1.195 
Diminution of stocks  - 334 
Total availability  8.148  ~ 
Human  consumption  6.130  6.434 
Livestocks  feeds  263  181 
Increase  in stocks  338  -
Others utilisations  35  47  . 
Exports  (2)  1.382  . 1.907 
Total utilisation  8.148  ~  .. 
(l) France  1969/70  :  metropolitan France--only. 
France  1970/71  : ..  o"~Zerseas -de-par·~ffients-TnCluded: 
(2) Inclu4.~ng intra-EEC  trade. 
(3)  In~l~diDg 361.000 t.  cane  sugar. 
Source  :  O.S.C.E.  - Statistique agricole  1972  - n° 1. TABLE  7 - GEOGRAPHIC  DISTRIBUTION  OF  THE  COMMUNITY's  FOOD  AID  IN  CEREALS,  1968-69/1972-73 




- Near  East 
..  ·- . 
Asia and Far  Eas~ 
Latin America 
Interl:l.at.Organ. 
1968-69(2)  1969-70(3)  1970-71(4) 
Eer  cent  per cent  per cent 
16,6  15,3 
6,6  10,4 
9,4  18,7 
- 8,6 
61,8  45,7 
- -
5,6  1,3 
100  100 
( 1) Malta.  and Turkey 
(2)  Total  Community's  actions 
(3)  II 
(4)  II 
(5)  " 
( 6)  " 
"  " 
"  " 
II  " 















(7)  Total  Community's  actions 
from  1968-69  to 1972-73  :  1.869.440 Tons 
1971-72(5)  1972-73(6) 
:eer  cent  _Eer  cent 
- 0,5 
18,1  5,4 
16,1  23,1 
13,0  (\  6,5 
40,6  45,7 
3,3  11,8 
8,9  7,0 











100 FINANCIAL  ANNEX 
L  A..r::Eropria ti  ons  in the  1974  Budget 
A.  Chapter  90 
1.  Cereals  113,000,000 uc.  (1) 
2.  Milk products  13,000,000 uc.  (2)  (3) 
3.  Sugar  2,000,000 uc. 
4.  Gther  expenses  5,000,000 uc. 
B.  FEOGA 
1.  Butteroil  51,000,000 uc.  (2). 
2.  Skim  Milk  Powder  39,000,000 uo.  (2)  (3) 
c.  TOTAL  223,000,000 uc. 
( 1)  'l'he  1973/74  Programme,  and  the remainder  of the  earlier programmes 
(2)  Estimate,  export  subsidies  excluded.  The  budget  appropriations  actu~lly 
include  export  subsidies. 
(3)  The  1973/74  programme  and  the  remainder  of the  1972/73 programme. 
(4)  A proposal of the  Commission is currently under  consideration by . 
the Council,  aimed at  grouping  under  the  chapter 90 the total of 
appropriations  for  food  aid  (of.  COM{73)  2150  final). II. Estimates  of Appropriations  for  1975 
The  product  prices,  representing the real cost  of food  aid 
(i.e.  without  counting  expo·rt  subsidies  where  appropriate),  were  calcu-
lated  as  follows  : 
..:.  wheat  average  intervention pric.e:  74/75  ( 110 uc/t) ,  plus deli  very 
to  FAS  stage  (4  uc/t) 
(1) 
- husked rice  current  market  price  (230 uc/t),  plus delivery to  FAS 
stage  (4 uc/t) 
-milk powder  current  intervention price 74/75  (760  uc/t),  plus delivery 
to  FAS  stage  (5  uc/t),  less current  export  subsidy 
(llO uc/t) 
- butteroil  curreat  5nternal price 74/75  (2420 uc/t),  plus  delivery to 
FAS  stage  (5  uc/t),  less  current  expert  subsidy  (1320 uc/t) 
- sugar  current  intervention price !  for· first  quality sugar packed in 
jute sacks  (250 uc/t)  plus  delivery to  FAS  stage  (5  uc/t). 
(1)  In  the  present  market  situation,  rice will have  to  be  purchased in the 
Community's  market. 1.  QUANTITIES  AND  VALUES  (FAS) 
Price in 
Wheat  114 
Husked  rice  236 
Povrdered  skim  milk  656 
Butteroil  1.106 
Sugar  270 
2.  DISTRIBUTION  AND  TRANSPORT  COSTS 
0 
Cereals  (wheat  and rice;  40 
Powdered  skim  milk  100 
Butteroil  100 
Sugar  100 
uc/t  Quantity  (t)  Value  in uc 
950.000  (1)  108.300.000 
50.000  (1)  .11. Boo. ooo 
80.000  52.48o  .• ooo 
45.000  49.770.000 
10.000  2.700.000 
225.050.000 
333,000  (1/3  13-300.000 
of quantities 
in  (1)  above) 
40.000  (50%  of  4.000.000 
quantities in 
( l) above) 
22.500  (50%  of  2.250.000 
quantities  in 
(1)  above) 
10.000  1.000.000 
20.550.000 
3.  OTHER  PRODUCTS  20.000.000, 
" 
SUB  TOT.Aa.  265.600.000 
4.  PROVISION  OF  15  % (TO  COVER  INCREASES  IN  BASIC 
PRICES,  TRANSPORT  COSTS,  ETC) 
TOTAL 
39.840.000 
305.440.000  (2) 
(1)  Assuming  the  existence  of national actions  (700.000 T),  additional to 
Community  actions  (1.000.000 T) 
(2)  Assuming  no  national actions,  i.e. 1.700.000 T  of  Community  actions  (of 
which  25.000 tons  would  be  rice),  the total cost  would  be  411  Muc,  i.e. 
188  Muc  more  than  the  appropriations  in the  1974  Community  budget,  and 
97  Muc  more  than the appropriations in the  Community  budget,  plus national  ~c 
actions  (estimated  at 91  Muc.) III. The  Annual  Credit  Requirements  (1) 
1.  On  tpe  assumption that national actions  would  be  additional to 




305  Muc. 
335  Muc. 
369  Muc. 
2.  In the  absence  of national actions,  i.e.  assuming  a 




411  Muc. 
452  Muc. 
487  Muc. 